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I. Introduction
There is a common presumption that financial crises are not alike as the triggers of crises dif-
fer, and the economic and institutional environments in which crises take place vary amongst
countries. Recent triggers for crises include sovereign debt default (the Russian crisis in
August 1998), risk management strategies (the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Man-
agement, LTCM, in September 1998), sudden stops in capital flows (Brazil in early 1999),
collapses of speculative bubbles (the dot-com crisis in 2000), inconsistencies between fun-
damentals and policy settings (as in Argentina in 2001) and a liquidity squeeze (associated
with the pressure in the U.S. subprime mortgage market from mid-2007).1 These examples
involve countries with highly developed financial markets as well as a number of emerging
markets.
This lack of commonality amongst crisis aﬀected countries is reflected in the development
of theoretical models of financial turmoil. The first generation models emphasize the role of
macroeconomic variables in causing currency crises in the presence of fixed exchange rates
(Flood and Marion (1999)); the second generation models focus on the role of speculative
attacks; while more recently models focus on institutional imbalances, information asymme-
tries and network eﬀects (Allen and Gale (2000); Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003); Kodres
and Pritsker (2002); Yuan (2005), Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) and Allen and Babus (2008)).
The identification of shocks triggering a crisis is just one dimension to understanding financial
crises. A second, and arguably more important dimension, is to identify the transmission
mechanisms that propagate shocks from the source country across national borders and
across financial markets. The literature draws a distinction between the transmission of
crises through normal relationships between markets, and transmission through additional
linkages which occur during crisis periods only. These additional linkages are known as con-
tagion (see Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000); Pericoli and Sbracia (2003)). Dungey,
Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2005) show how this definition of contagion nests the
existing empirical bivariate correlation tests of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) (and its multivari-
ate extension), the coexceedances test of Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003), the exchange market
pressure approach of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), and the outlier approaches of
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) and Pesaran and Pick (2007).2
It is not entirely straightforward to combine existing theoretical models into a general empir-
ical framework in which to model and test the relative strengths of alternative transmission
mechanisms operating during financial crises.3 The strategy followed in this paper is to
1Further analysis of these crises are given in Lowenstein (2001); Jorion (2000); Baig and Goldfajn (2000);
del Torre, Levy, Yeyati and Schmulker (2003); and the IMF (2008) Global Financial Stability Report, in the
case of the U.S. subprime crisis.
2Other important empirical work on contagion includes Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), Caporale,
Cipollini and Spagnolo (2005), Billio and Pelizzon (2003).
3Some previous attempts are by van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) who focus on banking channels;
Glick and Rose (1999) who look at regional linkages; and Boyer, Kumagai and Yuan (2006) who emphasise
liquidity eﬀects. Perhaps the most extensive recent work is by Kaminsky (2006) who considers a broad range
of variables, classified according to alternative theoretical crisis models.
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adopt a broader approach and focus on the factor structures of the transmission mecha-
nisms linking international asset markets. Formally the model is based on the theoretical
framework of Kodres and Pritsker (2002). This leads to a latent factor structure which is
transformed into a model that admits three broad contagious transmission mechanisms ac-
cording to the classification proposed by Dungey and Martin (2007). The first corresponds
to shocks originating in a particular asset market within a particular country (Idiosyncratic)
which transmit to all financial markets. The second represents mechanisms originating in
a specific asset market class (Market), for example stocks or bonds, that jointly impact al-
ternative classes of asset market. The third mechanism represents shocks beginning in a
particular country which impact upon the asset markets of other countries (Country). If
the structure of these three transmission mechanisms is found to be common across diﬀerent
financial crises, this would suggest that all crises are indeed alike regardless of the nature of
the initial shock and the economic and institutional environments of the aﬀected country.
Alternatively, if the propagation mechanisms vary across crises, perhaps as a result of the
development of new strains of contagion, this would suggest that crises are indeed unique at
least across their source and their transmission mechanism.
The factor model is successfully implemented for a series of five crises across six countries over
the period 1998 to 2007; the Russian/LTCM crisis; the Brazilian crisis; the dot-com crisis; the
Argentinian crisis and the recent U.S. subprime mortgage and credit crisis.4 A key empirical
result is that a general model can be specified to explain the contagious linkages operating
over a broad array of financial crises. Moreover, as all possible transmission mechanisms are
found to be statistically significant in each crisis investigated, this suggests that the answer
to the title of the paper is ‘Yes’. The crises which generated the most contagion are the
Russian/LTCM and U.S. subprime crises, which both began in credit markets and spread
to stock markets. However, this conclusion needs qualification as the relative contribution
of each channel to the volatility of returns in asset markets does vary across crises.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The theoretical model is outlined in Section II
where the excess returns on assets are specified in terms of a set of latent factors. The form
of these factors are discussed in Section III. The factors are expressed (rotated) following the
classification proposed by Dungey and Martin (2007). Section IV provides a discussion of the
data, key empirical results are reported in Section V, while some additional robustness checks
and sensitivity analyses are conducted in Section VI. Concluding comments are provided in
Section VII.
II. A Model of Contagion
In this section a theoretical model of contagion is developed whereby excess returns on
financial assets for  countries are expressed in terms of a set of latent factors. These
4Other financial crisis have also occured during this period including Iceland and Turkey (mid 2006)
and China (late February 2007). To control the dimension of the empirical application the approach is to
condition the empirical results on these crisis.
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factors capture a range of channels that link asset markets including common factors that
simultaneously impact upon all asset markets, idiosyncratic factors that are specific to a
single market, and contagion which transmits through additional channels arising during
times of financial stress. The approach is related to the work of Kodres and Pritsker (2002)
with one important diﬀerence: the solution is derived in terms of asset returns instead of
asset prices. Formally this is achieved by changing the preference function of agents and the
underlying distributional assumptions of the model.
The model consists of heterogenous international agents who choose portfolios from  risky
assets with return vector and a risk-free asset  across a set of countries. Three groups of
agents consist of informed investors (denoted as ), uninformed investors (denoted as ) and
noise traders. The informed and uninformed investors are assumed to derive portfolios based
on optimizing behavior, whereas the noise traders do not. In the specification of the model,
each country is assumed to be a two-period endowment economy with a fixed net supply
  that provides one risky asset. This assumption is relaxed in the empirical application
where the number of risky assets of each country is extended to two assets. Investors in each
economy trade assets in the first period at a price vector  and consume the liquidation
value , of assets in the second period. Market equilibrium is where the supply of the risky
asset   equals the sum of the demands of the three groups of agents
 = ∗1 + ∗1 + ln  (1)
where  and  are respectively the number of informed and uninformed investors, ∗ is
a ( × 1) vector of the optimal proportions of risky assets held by investor  =   and
1 is period 1 wealth. The term ∗1 is the optimal demand for risky assets of informed
agents, ∗1 is the optimal demand for risky assets of uninformed agents, and ln  is the
total demand of risky assets of noise traders.
In period 1, the informed and uninformed investors are assumed to choose between the
proportion of the portfolio held in risky assets and the proportion of the portfolio held in a
risk free asset (1− 0)  that maximizes expected utility from wealth in period two (2)
max
[ (2) |Ω] = max
n
ln
h
 (1−)2
¯¯¯
Ω
io
  =   (2)
subject to the wealth constraint
2 = (1 +)1 (3)
where  is the relative risk aversion parameter and
 = 0+ (1− 0)  (4)
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is the return on the portfolio where  is a ( × 1) vector of ones. The information set of
investor  =   is represented by Ω.
The return on the  risky asset is defined as the percentage diﬀerence between the unknown
liquidation value of the asset in period two (), and its price in period one ()
 =  −    = 1 2 · · ·   (5)
The liquidation values of the  assets in the next period are determined according to
ln  = ln  + ln (6)
where  represents an information factor with distribution
ln  ∼  ¡Σ¢ 
and  is decomposed into a set of  macroeconomic factors in the next period (ln +1) with
loadings  and  idiosyncratic factors (ln )
ln =  ln +1 + ln  (7)
The macroeconomic and idiosyncratic factors are assumed to have the following representa-
tions
ln +1 = ln  + ln 
ln  ∼  (0Σ) (8)
ln  ∼  (0 ) 
whereby the macroeconomic factors are integrated processes of order one while the idio-
syncratic factors are white noise. The assumption that the variance-covariance matrix of
ln  is the identity matrix   is a standard condition adopted to identify latent factors in
state-space models.
The optimal solution to the portfolio problem of the informed and the uninformed investors
is of the form (see Appendix A1)
∗ = 1
∙
 [|Ω]−  + 1
2
 [|Ω]
¸
 [|Ω]−1   =   (9)
where  = ln (1 +) and  = ln (1 +) represent logarithmic returns. In contrast to
the informed and uninformed investors, noise traders are assumed to buy and sell assets
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based solely on their own idiosyncratic need for liquidity which does not depend upon the
fundamental value of assets ().
The information set of the informed investor is defined as
Ω = {ln  ln}  (10)
in which case the conditional moments in (9) are given by (see Appendix A2)
 [|Ω ] = ln  +  ln  − ln
  [|Ω ] = 0 + Σ (11)
The information set of the uninformed investor is defined as
Ω = {ln}  (12)
in which case the conditional moments in (9) are given by (see Appendix A3)
 [|Ω ] = ln +  + Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0
#−1
×
∙
ln  +  (
0 + Σ)
1 ln − 
¸

(13)
  [|Ω ] = [Σ + Σ]−Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0 ¤−1Σ0
To complete the specification of the demand for risky assets in (1), the net demand of noise
traders, ln , is assumed to have the distribution
ln  ∼ (0Σ)
To derive an expression of the model in terms of excess asset returns, let
 = ln+1 − ln −  
represent the vector of  realized excess returns, where  and +1 are respectively the
current and next period price vectors. In Appendix A4, it is shown that in equilibrium the
solution of the model is characterized by  being expressed in terms of the latent factors
{ln  ln  ln  ln } according to
 = 0 + 1 ln  + 2 ln + 3 ln  + 4 ln  (14)
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where ln  = ln+1 −  [ ln | ] is an expectations error which is assumed to be  The
 matrices are functions of the parameters of the model and the conditional expectations
expressions in (11) and (13) (see Appendix A4 for details). This specification represents a
multifactor model of asset markets similar to the class of empirical contagion models proposed
by Dungey and Martin (2007). An important empirical implication of this equation is that
the eﬀect of contagion during financial crises is to change the structure of the  matrices.
For example, in a noncrisis period where there is no contagion, this is represented by 0
and Σ in (7) and (8) being diagonal matrices, with the model reducing to the class of factor
models used in international finance to price assets in “normal times” as proposed by Bekaert
and Hodrick (1992), Solnik (1974), Dumas and Solnik (1995) and Longin and Solnik (1995).
It is this property which is exploited in the empirical application to identify the parameters
of the model.
III. Empirical Factor Specification
The linear factor representation in (14) expresses excess returns on assets as a function of
factors that encapsulate shocks to information (ln ), noise traders (ln ), macroeconomic
shocks (ln ) and the expectation errors from forecasting future prices on assets (ln ). An
alternative representation is to rotate the factors into global (), market ()  country ()
and idiosyncratic () components according to Dungey and Martin (2007). In the empirical
analysis  = 12 which consists of six countries Argentina (A), Brazil (B), Canada (C),
Mexico (M), Russia (R) and the United States (U), each with two asset markets stocks (),
and bonds (). Of the six countries used in the empirical analysis, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico
and Russia represent the emerging financial markets, and the U.S. and Canada represent the
industrial financial markets. In the second quarter of 2007, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina
accounted for 46 percent of total emerging market bond trading. Russia accounted for an
additional 4 percent. Thus, the four emerging countries examined here account for about 50
percent of the total emerging market debt (see EMTA Survey (2007)). The set of countries
is expanded in Section VI.
In specifying the empirical factor model, care is taken to distinguish between the factors
operating during noncrisis and crisis periods. Five crisis specifications are considered cor-
responding to the Russia/LTCM crisis in the second half of 1998, the Brazilian crisis in
early 1999, the dot-com crisis in 2000, the Argentinian crisis 2001-2005, and the recent U.S.
subprime crisis beginning mid 2007. The choice of crisis dates is discussed in Section A.
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A. Noncrisis Specification
The factor specification during the noncrisis period decomposes excess returns of the six
stock () and bond () markets into four broad sets of factors. The noncrisis specification
is
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣






· · ·






⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
                  
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎣
123
⎤
⎦ +
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
 
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∙ 
¸
| {z } | {z }
Common Market
+
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
          
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣






⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
| {z }
Country
+ 
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝

⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣

⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

| {z }
Idiosyncratic
(15)
The first set of factors are referred to as the common factors. The first two factors within
this set (1  2 ) impact upon all asset markets, across all countries with loadings given by¡  ¢ for asset market  =   in country  The third factor in the common set of factors
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(3 ) represents the set of emerging markets where crises originated during the sample period:
Argentina, Brazil and Russia, with loadings
¡¢. The second set of factors is the market
factor, which captures respectively shocks to stock markets () and bond markets
¡¢ with
loadings ( ) and
¡¢  The set of country factors are given by      
which represent shocks specific to both the stock and bond market of each of the six countries
where the loadings for the country are  (stocks) and  (bonds)  Finally, the set of
idiosyncratic factors are given by the  factors with loading
¡¢  which represent shocks
that are specific to a particular asset market in a particular country.
The noncrisis factor specification in (15) is conveniently expressed as
 =  + + + (16)
where  is the (12× 1) vector of excess returns,  is the (3× 1) vector of common factors,
 is the (2× 1) vector of market factors,  is the (6× 1) vector of country factors, and  is
the (12× 1) vector of idiosyncratic factors. The   =    are parameter matrices of
conformable order to the empirical factors   and and correspond to those in (15).
From the properties of the factors in (14), {  } are all assumed to be independent
with zero means and normalised to have unit variances.
B. Crisis Specification
The crisis model is an extension of the noncrisis model by allowing for additional channels
representing contagion, which link international asset markets during financial crises. Three
broad channels are specified following Dungey and Martin (2007):
1. Market shock: the shock originates in a specific class of asset markets globally, which
impacts simultaneously on all other asset markets.
2. Country shock: the shock originates in a particular country which transmits to the
asset markets of other countries.
3. Idiosyncratic shock: the shock originates in a specific asset market of a country which
impacts upon global asset markets.
The Russian/LTCM Crisis The Russian crisis is specified to begin in the Russian bond
market. The LTCM crisis is interpreted as a credit shock and is assumed to originate in the
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U.S. bond market. It is not possible to separate out the two crises and model the full set of
transmission mechanisms for each as a result of the shortness of the LTCM crisis period.5
The strategy adopted is to model both crises jointly by including idiosyncratic shocks arising
from the Russian bond market and the U.S. bond market, together with the asset market
and country contagion channels. The crisis sample period is taken as the Russian crisis
period, namely August to the end of 1998. This may have the eﬀect of underestimating the
importance of the LTCM crisis as its eﬀects may be partly diluted by using a longer sample
period than is necessary.
The Russian/LTCM crisis model is specified as
 =  + + + (17)
where the parameter matrices are defined as
 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
         
· · · · · · · · ·
         
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
  =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
 +    +    +    +    +    +   
· · · · · ·
  +  
  +  
  +  
  +  
  +  
  +  
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
     +   
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
 
 
 
  +  
 
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

5Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2006, 2007) separate the eﬀects of the Russian and LTCM
crises, by looking at just one type of asset and a restricted number of propagation mechanisms.
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and
 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
          
  
  
  
  
  
 +   
  +  
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦

The parameter matrices are specified by augmenting the noncrisis parameter matrices in (15)
and (16) to allow for contagion as well as structural breaks in the factor structures during
the crisis period. The market contagion channels are represented by the parameter  in the
matrix  which measures the strength of the stock market factor in the crisis period on the
bond market in country  while the parameter  measures the strength of the bond market
factor on the stock market in country  The country contagion channel from Russia to asset
market  in country  is controlled by the parameter  The strength of the idiosyncratic
contagion channel from the Russian (U.S.) bond market to asset market  in country  is
determined by the parameter 
¡¢  All structural breaks in the factors during the
crisis period are controlled by the parameter   For example, the eﬀects of a structural break
in the stock and bond market factors during the crisis period on country  are respectively
given by   and    A structural break in the Russian country factor corresponding to its
stock and bond markets in the crisis are given by respectively   and   The structural
breaks in the Russian and U.S. idiosyncratic bond factors during the crisis are represented by
respectively   and   The common factors () are assumed not to exhibit structural
breaks during the crisis period.
The Brazilian Crisis The specification of the Brazilian crisis model is similar to the
Russian/LTCM crisis model in (17), with the exception that there is just one idiosyncratic
shock now arising from the Brazilian bond market. The two market channels of contagion
are as before, which are represented by columns 4 and 5 of the  matrix in (17). The
country channel of contagion switches from column 5 (Russian country factor) to column
2 (Brazilian country factor) of the  matrix. The idiosyncratic contagion channel arising
from the Brazilian bond market shock is specified by switching column 11 in the  matrix
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in (17) to column 8 (Brazilian bond factor), and deleting column 12 with the exception of
the parameter  .
The Dot-Com Crisis The dot-com crisis model has a similar structure to the Brazilian
crisis model. The country channel of contagion is now found in column 6 of the  matrix
(U.S. country factor), and the idiosyncratic contagion channel is specified in column 6 of the
 matrix (U.S. stock factor) in (17).
The Argentinian Crisis The Argentinian crisis model follows the same form as the pre-
vious two models. The country channel of contagion is now found in column 1 of the 
matrix (Argentinian country factor), and the idiosyncratic contagion channel is specified in
column 7 of the  matrix (Argentinian bond factor) in (17).
The U.S. Subprime Mortgage and Credit Crisis The specification of the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage and credit crisis is similar to the dot-com crisis specification with one im-
portant exception. In the dot-com crisis there is a single idiosyncratic channel of contagion
operating through the U.S. stock market as it is clear that this crisis originated in the U.S.
stock market. The U.S. subprime mortgage and credit crisis is characterized by turbulence
that spread from subprime mortgage markets to credit markets more generally, and then to
short-term interbank markets as liquidity dried up in certain segments of the markets, par-
ticularly in structured credits. As the U.S. crisis manifested itself mainly in credit markets,
this suggests that contagion should run from bond markets to stock markets in the model
specified here. To test this proposition, both stock and bond U.S. idiosyncratic channels of
contagion are allowed for in the subprime crisis specification. In which case the idiosyncratic
contagion channels are specified in columns 6 and 12 of the  matrix in (17). As idiosyn-
cratic shocks are allowed for in both U.S. asset markets, no country contagion channel from
the U.S. is considered for this crisis.
IV. Data
The data consist of daily excess returns on stocks and bonds, all expressed in U.S. dollars,
beginning March 31, 1998 and ending December 31, 2007. The daily data are constructed
from bond yields and stock indices. All data sources and formal definitions of the variables
are given in Appendix B.
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The U.S. and Canadian bonds are modelled using 10 year corporate BBB yields, with the
Canadian yields converted into U.S. dollars. Bond returns are constructed for the two de-
veloped markets as
 = − ( − −1−1)  (18)
where  is the yield on a bond with term to maturity,  = 10 years. That is, returns are
computed simply by taking the first diﬀerence of the yields, multiplying this change in yields
by the maturity and then changing the sign (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997)).6
Emerging market bonds are represented by U.S. dollar denominated sovereign debt to avoid
the lack of liquidity in emerging market domestic currency denominated bonds. As bonds
are issued only sporadically in the emerging countries it is not possible to derive a daily
10-year bond series as with the developed countries. The approach adopted is to choose a 10
year bond issued near the start of the sample period for an emerging country and track this
bond over the sample period. For these bonds, the returns are computed using (18) with the
term to maturity, , now declining monotonically over the sample. However, as the sample
covers approximately 9 years, this bond will become less liquid as it approaches maturity
near the end of the sample. In the case of the Argentinian bond used, this bond actually
matures before the end of the sample period. To circumvent potential liquidity problems
the approach is to choose another set of 10 year bonds beginning July 1, 2004 and track
these bonds through the remaining part of the sample. Although this involves using bonds
of diﬀering maturities, by working with returns accounting for breaks instead of yields, or
even yield changes, makes the returns data on bonds commensurate.
The stock market indices are those for the major indices in each country, given in Appendix
B. All indices are expressed in domestic currencies and converted into USD equivalents using
daily exchange rates. Missing observations arising from the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 are replaced by the previously observed price. Stock returns are computed by taking
the first diﬀerence of the natural logarithm of the stock prices.
All bond and stock returns are expressed in terms of excess returns by subtracting the returns
on a risk-free rate, as represented by the U.S. Treasury 10-year benchmark bond yield. The
excess returns are expressed in percentage terms by multiplying each series by 100. Time
series plots of the excess returns on stocks and bonds are presented in Figure 1. The shaded
regions presented in the figure correspond to the period of the five crises investigated, whose
dates are discussed below.
6The formula for converting bond yields into returns is just an approximation, but as the data are daily
the error from using the approximation should be small (Craine and Martin (2008)).
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Two filters are applied to the raw returns presented in Figure 1 before estimating the model.
First, all 12 excess returns are adjusted for any dynamics by estimating a 12-variate VAR
with a constant and two lags. Pre-diagnostic checking shows that higher order lags do not
qualitatively change the empirical properties of the model.
Second, the VAR contains a set of dummy variables to capture institutional changes which
have a once-oﬀ big impact on excess returns. A dummy variable is included in the Russian
bond equation of the VAR to account for the large fall in excess bond returns from 57727
percent to 44969 percent, arising from the change in the Russian Finance Minister on May
25, 1999. Inspection of the excess returns of Argentinian bonds in Figure 1 shows that
there are five large spikes that occur during the Argentinian crisis: the dates are April 4
and October 4 in 2002, April 4 and October 6 in 2003, and April 6 in 2004. These dates
correspond to the coupon dates after all Argentinian sovereign debt went into default, with
the price for these bonds declining because of uncertainty surrounding the scheduled coupon
payment. To correct for these outliers a dummy variable is included in the Argentinian bond
equation of the VAR, which has a value of one on the five dates and zero otherwise. Finally,
there are a number of crises that have occurred which are potentially too small to be able
to model individually. To condition the results on these crises additional dummy variables
are also included into the VAR specification. The dummy variables consist of the Turkish
crisis May 1 to June 30 in 2006, and the large movements in asset returns on February 27
and March 13 in 2007, during the concerns over Chinese stock markets.
The residuals from estimating the VAR are taken to be the filtered excess returns subse-
quently used in the empirical analysis.7 The final data set of filtered excess returns comprises
2544 observations across bond and stock markets for the six countries.
A. Crisis Dates
The choice of the dates of the crisis periods are summarized in Table 1. This choice is
based on important institutional events surrounding each crisis, together with empirical pre-
testing and sensitivity analysis to fine-tune the timing of the crisis dates. Details of the
7Further filtering of the data could be entertained, such as allowing for time-varying volatility during
each sub-period. Some strategies would be to incorporate GARCH specifications either using the approach
of Bekaert, Harvey and Ng (2005), or the factor GARCH specification of Dungey and Martin (2004) and
Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2006). However, conditional moment tests of conditional
volatility applied to the VAR standardized residuals given in Section 6 of the paper, show little evidence
of time-varying volatility within asset markets during the crisis periods. Empirically this result is partly a
reflection of the small duration of the crisis periods.
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empirical methods together with some additional sensitivity analysis of the chosen dates, are
presented below in Section 6. The Russian crisis is chosen to begin with the announcement
of the Russian Government’s deferral of its bond repayments on August 17, 1998, while the
end of the crisis is taken as the end of 1998, following Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo
and Martin (2006) for commensurability. The LTCM crisis begins when the Federal Reserve
orchestrated the bailout of LTCM on September 23, and ends with the inter-FOMC Federal
Reserve rate cut on October 15 (see also Committee on the Global Financial System (1999)).
The start of the Brazilian crisis is chosen as January 7, 1999, before the eﬀective devaluation
of the real on January 15, 1999, which followed the loss of nearly USD$14 billion of reserves
in two days. The end of the crisis occurs in the next month on February 25, after several new
governors of the Central Bank had been appointed and prior to the agreement of a revised
IMF program in early March 1999.
The dating of the dot-com crisis is based on inspection of stock returns given in Figure 1,
which shows that the main impact of the crisis occurs in the second quarter of 2000, especially
in the case of the stock markets of the United States, Canada and Mexico. Combined with
econometric sensitivity analysis, the dot-com crisis is chosen to begin on February 28, 2000,
and end on June 7, of the same year.
The start of the crisis in Argentina is chosen to begin October 11, 2001. This date occurs one
month prior to the introduction of the partial deposit freeze (corralito) and capital controls
(Cifarelli and Paladino (2004)), but occurs after the increase in volatility that began following
the “mega-swap” announced on June 3, 2001. The end of the crisis is taken as 3 March
2005, commensurate with the agreement for debt rescheduling and Argentina’s return to the
voluntary market.8 These dates correspond quite closely to those found using a threshold
bond spread in Wälti and Weder (2008). Given the length of the crisis period in Argentina,
some sensitivity experiments are conducted in Section 6.1 to determine the robustness of the
results to this choice of dates.
Turbulence in the U.S. subprime mortgage markets began in mid 2007. A broad range of
markets worldwide experienced heightened risk aversion and a sharp fall in liquidity. By early
August, credit spreads had widened substantially, stock markets had fallen significantly, and
term premia in interbank markets rose. The U.S. Federal Reserve reduced the federal funds
rate sharply by 50 basis points on August 18, reducing volatility in stock and credit markets,
8The period of the Argentinian crisis also coincides with an increase in volatility in the Brazilian asset
markets during the Brazilian Presidential election campaign of the first part of 2002. As the duration of
this increase in volatility is very short and primarily limited to Brazil, it is not modelled here as a separate
regime.
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however liquidity concerns persisted. Hence the U.S. subprime crisis model in this paper
contains data from July 26, 2007, until the end of our sample on December 31, 2007.
The noncrisis period is constructed by combining together all of the data between the crisis
dates in Table 1. Selected descriptive statistics of the filtered excess returns on stocks and
bonds during the noncrisis and crisis periods are presented in Tables 2 and 3 respectively.
All filtered returns have zero sample means as a result of including a constant in the VAR
to filter returns for lags and the identified institutional changes discussed above.
V. Empirical Results
The crisis and noncrisis models specified in the previous section are estimated using a gen-
eralized method of moments (GMM) estimator. This involves computing the unknown pa-
rameters by equating the theoretical moments of the model to the empirical moments of
the data for both the noncrisis and the crisis periods. As a result of the large number of
parameters in the model, the full system containing the noncrisis model and the five crisis
models are not estimated jointly. The approach is to estimate the noncrisis model jointly
with each of the crisis models one at a time.9
The objective function of the GMM estimator is specified as
 = 0 (19)
where is a vector containing the diﬀerences between the empirical and theoretical moments
and  is the optimal weighting matrix. All calculations are undertaken using the library
MAXLIK in GAUSS Version 7.0. The GMM estimates are computed by iterating over
the parameters and the optimal weighting matrix  , using the BFGS algorithm with the
gradients computed numerically.
An overall test of the model is based on testing the number of overidentification restrictions
using Hansen’s J-statistic
 =  (20)
where  is defined in (19) and  = 2544 is the sample size. The results of the overiden-
tification test for the full model are presented in Table 4 for each crisis, in the column
9In estimating the model the parameters        were found to be small, in which case they were
restricted to be zero. The restriction  =  = 0 means that there is no U.S. country factor. Setting = 0 in (15) has the eﬀect of making the U.S. equity market the common equity market factor.
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corresponding to three common factors. The specification of the model satisfies this test
at the 1 percent level for all crises and at the 5 percent level for all but the dot-com and
Argentinian crises.
Further tests of the number of common factors underlying the factor structure of each crisis
model are presented in Table 4. Apart from testing the three common factor model, tests
of two, one and no common factors are also presented. These tests amount to imposing
restrictions on the parameters in the matrices  and  in (16) and (17) and testing if the
restrictions are consistent with the data using the J-statistic in (20). Reducing the number
of common factors from three to two in the models is satisfied for the Brazilian and U.S.
subprime crisis models at the 5 percent level, where the p-values of the test are respectively
0624 and 0619. This restriction is also satisfied for the Russian/LTCM and Argentinian
crises at the 1 percent level, but not for the dot-com crisis model. Further restricting the
number of common factors from two to one leads to a clear rejection of the null hypothesis
for all crisis models at the 5 percent level with the exceptions of the Brazilian model where
the p-value is 0056 and the U.S. subprime crisis model where the p-value is 0060 Further
testing of the Brazilian and U.S. subprime crisis models for no common factors is clearly
rejected where both the p-values are 0000 Given that the approach adopted in this paper
is to specify a model that is common for all crises, for the rest of the paper the number of
common factors is chosen to be three for all crisis models.
A. Evidence of Contagion
In presenting the results, the relative strength of contagion is highlighted in terms of its
contribution to the total volatility of asset returns during the crisis periods. Given the inde-
pendence and normalization assumptions of the factors, the (12× 12) theoretical variance-
covariance matrix of returns during the crisis period is immediately obtained from (17),
as
 [0] = 0 +0 +0 +0 (21)
where it is assumed that  is standardized to have zero mean. The variance decompositions
are simply the individual components of the diagonal terms of (21), expressed as a percentage
of the total, with the parameter values replaced by their GMM parameter estimates. For
example, from (17) the contribution of the bond market factor to the variance of stocks in
Argentina is
  = 100×
¡¢2
 
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where
 = ()2 + ()2 + ()2 + ( +  )2 +
¡¢2
+()2 +
¡¢2 + ()2 + ¡¢2 + ¡¢2 
Table 5 gives the percentage contribution of contagion to total volatility in stock and bond
markets for the five crisis periods. Complete variance decompositions which contain both
noncrisis and crisis factor contributions for the five crisis periods, are given in Appendix
C. For comparative purposes, Table 5 also gives the sample variance. This table highlights
three important points concerning the overall size of contagion from 1998 to 2007. First,
the Russian/LTCM crisis is widespread as it aﬀects all countries, developed and emerging,
and both classes of asset markets, stocks and bonds. The stock markets hit hardest during
this crisis are Brazil (9863 percent)  the U.S. (6374 percent)  Argentina (4398 percent) 
Canada (4146 percent) Mexico (3565 percent)  with Russia (2588 percent) being the least
aﬀected. The bond markets most aﬀected during this crisis are Brazil (8933 percent) 
Mexico (8567 percent)  Canada (4592 percent)  the U.S. (3138 percent)  and Argentina
(3101 percent). The low contribution of contagion to Russian bonds (455 percent) in Table
5, simply reflects that the Russian crisis originated in this market. In the case of Brazil,
these results support Baig and Goldfajn (2000) and Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and
Martin (2007), who document the portfolio eﬀects of the Russian crisis on Brazil.
Second, comparison of the relative importance of contagion during the financial crises chrono-
logically between Russia/LTCM in 1998 and the U.S. subprime crisis in 2007, shows that
the strength of contagion tends to become weaker in the intervening crises, with the eﬀects
becoming more fragmented across asset markets and national borders. The Brazilian crisis
mainly impacts emerging markets, with the eﬀects on the developed markets except U.S.
stocks being relatively small. In particular, the eﬀects on Russian stock (2720 percent) and
bond (6509 percent) markets potentially reflect an overhang of the Russian crisis. There are
also important eﬀects on the stock market in Argentina (6226 percent) and the bond mar-
ket in Mexico (8248 percent). During the dot-com and Argentinian crises, the main eﬀects
are on stocks, with very little impact on bond markets, although the dot-com crisis aﬀects
the Brazilian bond market markedly (9406 percent). The South American stock markets
are aﬀected most during the dot-com crisis where the contributions of contagion to total
volatility are Argentina (9247 percent), Mexico (8850 percent) and Brazil (3963 percent) 
The Canadian and Russian stock markets are not particularly aﬀected by the dot-com cri-
sis. These results not only confirm that the dot-com crisis is a crisis in stocks, but also
suggest that Russian asset markets had finally settled down after the Russian crisis. There
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is a further reduction in the overall relative impact of contagion on South American stock
markets during the Argentinian crisis compared to the dot-com and previous crises, with the
exception of Brazil. The largest impact occurs in Brazilian stocks (6193 percent) and U.S.
bond markets (3459 percent) 
Third, and in stark contrast to the diminishing strength of contagion channels during the
previous financial crises and the apparent far lower impact of contagion on bond markets
during the dot-com and Argentinian financial crises, the eﬀects of contagion during the U.S.
subprime crisis are widespread with no country immune. In bond markets the contagion
eﬀects in Argentina (9431 percent) and the U.S. (9219 percent) account for almost all
of the volatility in these markets, while in stock markets three of the six countries, Brazil,
Canada and Mexico, have contagion eﬀects greater than 4000 percent of volatility. A similar
result occurs during the Russian/LTCM crisis where the contribution of contagion to stock
market volatility is greater than 40 percent for four stock markets and four bond markets.
Given that the Russian asset markets are largely immune to the dot-com and Argentinian
crises, it is interesting to observe that Russia is also aﬀected by the subprime crisis in bond
markets, where approximately 30 percent in Russian bonds is the result of contagion.10
B. Comparison of Contagion Channels Across Crises
The previous discussion highlights the changes in the relative importance of contagion in
contributing to asset market volatility across crises. In this section the estimated factor model
is used to breakdown the relative contribution of contagion into its separate components.
Tables 6 and 7 provide the variance decompositions of the contagion transmission mechanisms
for stocks and bonds respectively, due to market, country and idiosyncratic channels, across
the five crisis periods.
The Russian/LTCM crisis results in Table 6 show that idiosyncratic bond shocks and Russian
country shocks are important in transmitting contagion to stock markets. The dominant
mechanism is the country channel where stocks in the U.S. (4097 percent) and Argentina
(3805 percent) are hardest hit, whilst Brazilian stocks (5195 percent) are aﬀected by the
direct link from Russian bonds, and U.S. and Canadian stocks (both 2157 percent) are
aﬀected by the direct link from U.S. bonds. In the case of bond markets, Table 7 shows
that all channels are operating. The most aﬀected country during the LTCM phase of the
Russian/LTCM crisis is Brazil, where stocks (5195 percent) and bonds (1567 percent) are
10Both the Argentine and Russian central banks injected liquidity into their respective financial systems
during this period (see Fitch Ratings (2007)).
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aﬀected directly by Russian bonds. The Mexican bond market is also particularly aﬀected
by the Russia/LTCM crisis, with almost one quarter (2485 percent) coming through the
idiosyncratic U.S. bond channel. Mexican stock markets are much less aﬀected by this
source of contagion.
The eﬀects on the Russian asset markets during the Brazilian crisis can be attributed to an
idiosyncratic channel from the Brazilian bond market in the case of Brazilian bonds (3462
percent) and channels through the bond and stock market channels. In other asset markets
aﬀected by this crisis it is the country channel that transmits contagion to the Argentinian
stock market (5151 percent) and the Mexican bond market (7752 percent)  see Tables 6
and 7 respectively.
All three contagion channels are at play in transmitting the dot-com crisis to stock mar-
kets as evident by looking through the results in Tables 6 and 7. The largest eﬀect is on
the stock markets in Argentina (8540 percent) through the country channel, and Mexico
(7635 percent) through the bond market channel. Eﬀects via the idiosyncratic channel from
U.S. stocks on Brazilian (2036 percent) and Mexico (1020 percent) stocks, are relatively
larger than they are for Argentina and Canada. Russian stocks are immune to the dot-com
crisis as are all but the Brazilian bond markets, where strong eﬀects come from the stock
market (4291 percent) and idiosyncratic channel from U.S. stocks (5082 percent).
The contagion channels operating during the Argentinian crisis are even more selective
than they are in the previous crises, with just the stock market in Brazil being aﬀected
(1870 percent) through the bond market channel, and (4323 percent) through the Argen-
tinian bond channel, see Table 6. However, as the results in Table 7 show that with the
exception of the U.S. most bond markets are immune to the Argentinian crisis, suggest-
ing that the market linkage transmitting contagion to the Brazilian stock market is being
transmitted via the developed U.S. markets. This result is in line with the role of devel-
oped markets in spreading crises between developing markets highlighted in Kaminsky and
Reinhart (2003) .
Table 6 shows that during the subprime crisis in the U.S. all channels are operating to
transmit the crisis to stock markets. No one channel dominates, although the idiosyncratic
link from U.S. stock markets is of lesser importance than the remaining links. The results for
the bond markets in Table 7 show that the eﬀects of the subprime crisis are also widespread,
with the main eﬀects felt by Argentina (8490 percent) through the idiosyncratic U.S. stock
market channel, and Russia (3011 percent) through the U.S. bond market idiosyncratic
channel. The U.S. bond market (8798 percent) is aﬀected through the stock market channel,
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which represents a second-round eﬀect of the credit market shock that occurred first in the
U.S. bond market.11
C. Testing the Channels of Contagion
The variance decompositions discussed above provide a descriptive measure of the relative
impact of contagion on the volatility of asset returns during financial crises. To formalize the
strength of these mechanisms, Wald tests of the statistical significance of the market, country
and idiosyncratic contagion channels for each crisis period, are presented in Table 8.12 As
an example of the way the Wald test is performed, in the case of the Russian/LTCM crisis,
the Wald test of contagion from the stock market factor to the six bond markets consists of
testing that the joint restriction  = 0 ∀ in the matrix  in (17). Testing in the reverse
direction from the bond market factor to the six stock markets is given by testing the joint
restriction  = 0 ∀ in the matrix  in (17). The test of the country channel from Russia
to the 10 non-Russian asset markets is given by testing the parameter  in the matrix 
in (17). The test of the idiosyncratic contagion channel from Russian bonds to the other
11 asset markets is given by testing  =  = 0 whereas the test of the idiosyncratic
contagion channel from U.S. bonds to the other 11 asset markets during the LTCM crisis, is
given by testing  =  = 0 The form of the tests is similar for the other three crises.
The results of the Wald tests given in Table 8 reveal that all contagion channels are statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level. These tests provide strong support for the importance
of all contagion channels operating during all crises. These results also highlight the fact that
whilst some of the channels may not be economically significant given the results of the vari-
ance decompositions presented above, nonetheless these channels may still be statistically
significant.
VI. Robustness Checks and Additional Diagnostics
An important feature of the empirical model is that identification of the parameters depends
in a fundamental way on the dating of the crisis periods and the set of countries used to
identify the common factors. In this section a number of additional robustness checks and
11At the time of writing the paper, the sub-prime crisis had not ended. Extending the dataset to the end
of February 2008 made no substantive diﬀerence to the results reported here.
12Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2005) show the relationship between testing for contagion
using the factor model, and existing tests of contagion.
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diagnostic tests are performed on the factor model specification, with special attention given
to looking at the sensitivity of the results to changes in the crisis dates and the choice of
countries.
A. Crisis Dating Sensitivity Analysis
The empirical results presented are based on joint estimation of the model over a noncrisis
and crisis period. To examine the sensitivity of these results to the choice of crisis dates,
Figure 2 gives the p-values from performing the moment overidentification test based on the
J-statistic in (20), for changes in the start and the end dates of the five crises. A maximum
window of 5 days is chosen where either the start of the crisis period (continuous line) or
the end of the crisis period (dashed line) are adjusted. A zero day signifies the crisis dates
given in Table 1. The U.S. subprime crisis end date is not extended by 5 days as this crisis
is assumed to continue until the end of the sample. The p-values reported in Figure 2 in
general are qualitatively insensitive to changes in the dating of the five crises.13
Given that the Argentinian crisis period (11 October 2001 to 3 June 2005) is much longer
than the other crisis periods identified here, some additional sensitivity analysis is conducted
on Argentina by considering shorter crisis periods.14 Three crisis sub-periods are investigated
consisting of the first year of the crisis (11 October 2001 to 10 October 2002), the first two
years of the crisis (11 October 2001 to 10 October 2003) and the first three years of the crisis
(11 October 2001 to 10 October 2004). The results are in Table 9, which gives the variance
decompositions for the three crisis sub-periods and the total crisis period, where the total
period results are taken from Tables 6 and 7.
Comparing the contagion results across the four alternative crisis periods reveals that the
qualitative analysis of the contagion eﬀects is in general robust to the diﬀerent sample pe-
riods. The exceptions are mainly for Brazil and the U.S. asset markets. In the case of the
shorter crisis sample, Brazilian stocks receive around 4 percent contagion from the Argen-
tinian bond market channel, compared with 43 percent from both these channels in the total
sample. In the case of the two year sample Brazilian bonds receive almost 36 percent via
the Argentinian country channel, compared with less than 1 percent in the total sample.
For the U.S., the shorter sample periods result in contagion eﬀects from the idiosyncratic
13For each of the p-values reported in Figure 2, variance decompositions of the relative importance of the
factors are also computed, but not reported here to save space. In general, the variance decompositions are
insensitive to the choice of the crisis dates for the window of dates investigated.
14We would like to thank Roberto Rigobon for suggesting this to us.
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Argentinian bond channel on U.S. stocks being as high as 55 percent, in the third subsample,
compared with the less than 1 percent for the total sample period. These results suggest
that although there are potentially some changes in the way that contagion is transmitted
during the Argentinian crisis, especially from late 2004 to mid 2005, nonetheless contagion
is important during the total crisis period which provides support for the choice of the crisis
dates.
B. Extension of Countries
An important feature of the model to identify contagion during the crisis period, is the
specification of a set of common factors that operate during both the noncrisis and crisis
periods. As the common factors are latent, they are identified from the volatility structure
of the set of countries chosen in the sample. By extending the set of countries investigated
this improves the precision of the common factor estimates, and in turn, the estimates of
contagion.
To examine the robustness of the model of contagion to the inclusion of additional coun-
tries asset markets, the subprime crisis model is extended to accommodate four additional
developed countries consisting of Australia, Germany, Japan and the U.K.15 The volatility
decompositions for the stock and bond markets of the extended set of countries are presented
in Table 10. Consistent with the existing empirical results for the subprime crisis presented
in Tables 6 and 7, the additional countries all receive substantial amounts of contagion in
both stocks and bonds, further supporting the widespread nature of this crisis. A comparison
of the variance decompositions of the stock markets in Table 10 (extended country results)
and Table 6 (existing country stock market results) shows that the two sets of decomposi-
tions are similar overall, with the extended results actually showing a slight increase in the
relative strength of contagion across all six stock markets. A similar result occurs for the
bond markets in Brazil, Canada and Mexico, which also show some increases in the relative
importance of contagion. The main diﬀerences in the existing and extended results are with
the bonds markets of Argentina and the U.S. and to a lesser extent with Russia’s bond
market, where the extended results yield smaller estimates of contagion than the estimates
reported in Table 7, but nonetheless are still relatively large and statistically significant.
15See Appendix B for data sources and codes for the additional countries.
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C. Conditional Moment Tests
Conditional moment tests of first order autocorrelation  (1) and first order conditional
volatility  (1) in the standardized residuals of the VAR, are given in Table 11. The re-
sults of these tests are reported in terms of p-values, for diﬀerent crisis models. In practically
all cases considered, the p-values are greater than 001 showing that the null hypothesis of
no autocorrelation or no conditional volatility, is not rejected at the 1 percent level, and in
most cases is also not rejected at the 5 percent level.
D. Structural Break Tests
The specification of the model allows for the idiosyncratic parameters to exhibit a structural
break between the noncrisis and crisis periods. Tests of the significance of the structural
break are presented in Table 12 using a Wald test. In the case of the Russian/LTCM crisis,
from equation (17) the structural break tests are performed on the loadings of the stock
market (  ) and the bond market
¡ ¢ factors where  =  , the loadings of the
Russian country factor
¡   ¢, and the loadings of the Russian and U.S. idiosyncratic
bond factors
¡   ¢. Similar restrictions hold for the other three crisis models. All
tests are calculated using aWald test that the parameter  is zero. Under the null hypothesis
of no structural break, this amounts to the parameters associated with each factor being the
same in the noncrisis and crisis periods.
The results in Table 12 show strong evidence of structural breaks in practically all factors
investigated, across all five financial crises, with all p-values being less than 005 The strength
of these results are consistent with the empirical findings of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who
emphasize the important of allowing for increases in volatility in the source country when
testing for contagion (see also Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo and Martin (2005), for
further discussion of the role of structural break tests in tests of contagion).
VII. Conclusions
This paper investigated whether financial crises were alike by considering whether a single
modelling framework could fit multiple distinct crises. On this basis, financial crises were
alike. The framework introduced three potential channels for contagion eﬀects during a
financial crisis, and the empirical evidence showed that statistically each of these operated
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during every crisis examined - again on this basis, financial crises are alike. Economically,
however, the importance of the channels of contagion diﬀers across crises.
The modelling framework was derived by respecifying the theoretical model of Kodres and
Pritsker (2002) for solution in terms of the excess returns on assets, rather than prices. The
empirical implementation was a latent factor representation of the equilibrium solution of
that model. Three potential channels for contagion eﬀects were simultaneously identified
and quantified. The channels were: idiosyncratic channels which provided a direct link from
the nominated source asset market to international asset markets; market channels which
operated through either the bond or stock markets; and country channels which operated
through the asset markets of a country jointly.
The empirical investigation considered a common dataset over the period March 1998 to
December 2007 consisting of the stock and bond markets of six countries: Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Mexico, Russia and the U.S, although the results were also extended to allow for a
broader range of developed countries. The sample period covered five major crisis instances,
from the Russian and LTCM crises in 1998, the Brazilian crisis in 1999, the dot-com crisis
in 2000, the Argentinian crisis in 2002-2005 to the recent crisis associated with the U.S.
subprime market beginning mid 2007.
The Russian/LTCM crises had a widespread impact. All three contagion channels were active
in this period. The Brazilian crisis had greater impact on emerging markets than developed
markets, with a pronounced eﬀect on Russian asset markets, via all but the country channel.
Russian stock markets, however, were immune to the dot-com crisis, which mainly aﬀected
stock markets. Although all three contagion channels operated during the dot-com crisis the
eﬀects on bond markets were limited to the Brazilian bond market. Bond markets were also
little aﬀected by the Argentinian crisis, despite all three contagion channels being present
and statistically significant. This was not the case in the U.S. subprime crisis, where not
only were all contagion channels statistically significant, but the eﬀects of contagion were
widespread across asset markets and countries.
Contagion eﬀects were greatest in the Russian/LTCM crisis, and dissipated in the subsequent
Brazilian, dot-com and Argentinian crises, but returned with vehemence in the U.S. subprime
crisis. Using the extent of contagious eﬀects as a metric, the worst crises of the past decade
were the Russian/LTCM crisis in 1998 and the recent 2007 U.S. subprime crisis, which
interestingly both began in bond markets.
The empirical results presented have a number of important lessons for the building of the-
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oretical models of contagion. First, the empirical results suggest that it is feasible to specify
a unifying theoretical model that is applicable for modelling a range of crises regardless of
the nature of the initiating shock. Second, a number of potential mechanisms will need to
be specified to explain asset market returns and the transmission of contagion across inter-
national asset markets. In the empirical model these mechanisms were classified broadly
as common, market, country and idiosyncratic transmission mechanisms according to the
decomposition proposed by Dungey and Martin (2007), whilst in the theoretical model these
mechanisms represented information asymmetries, noise trading, macroeconomic shocks and
expectation errors, following the theoretical framework of Kodres and Pritsker (2002). The
empirical results showed that contagion operated via a range of channels, although the rel-
ative importance of each channel was found to vary across crises.
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Table 1: Summary of crisis dates.
Crisis Origin of Shock Start of Crisis Date End of Crisis Date
Russia Russian bonds 17 August 1998 31 December 1998
LTCM U.S. bonds 23 September 1998 15 October 1998
Brazil Brazilian bonds 7 January 1999 25 February 1999
Dot-com U.S. stocks 28 February 2000 7 June 2000
Argentina Argentinian bonds 11 October 2001 3 March 2005
U.S. Subprime U.S. bonds, stocks 26 July 2007 31 December 2007
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of filtered excess stock returns for selected periods.
Period/Crisis Statistic Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Russia 17 August 1998 - 31 December 1998
Max. 7.840 10.788 4.934 11.503 40.090 4.033
Min. -9.408 -9.596 -6.913 -11.963 -58.845 -3.576
St. dev. 3.129 3.972 1.682 3.344 11.837 1.445
LTCM 23 September 1998 - 15 October 1998
Max. 6.728 5.221 4.934 6.328 9.956 3.722
Min. -6.494 -6.135 -5.254 -8.917 -12.271 -3.576
St. dev. 3.425 3.456 2.482 3.880 6.757 1.687
Brazil 7 January 1999 - 25 February 1999
Max. 6.849 12.614 2.539 6.012 9.063 2.564
Min. -8.366 -11.555 -2.228 -6.136 -10.212 -4.239
St. dev. 2.728 5.052 1.152 2.404 4.223 1.272
Dot-com 28 February 2000 - 7 June 2000
Max. 2.844 4.732 4.423 6.944 6.949 4.364
Min. -5.236 -5.708 -4.845 -8.506 -7.192 -4.320
St. dev. 1.620 1.920 1.709 2.662 3.344 1.465
Argentina 11 October 2001 - 3 March 2005
Max. 15.925 13.382 5.072 4.903 8.429 6.039
Min. -32.553 -8.124 -3.986 -6.337 -10.751 -5.374
St. dev. 3.012 2.327 1.131 1.342 2.040 1.314
U.S. Subprime 26 July 2007 - 31 December 2007
Max. 7.293 6.477 4.250 5.807 4.408 3.668
Min. -5.496 -7.548 -5.582 -5.183 -4.139 -3.842
St. dev. 2.011 3.037 1.825 2.172 1.681 1.663
Non-crisis
Max. 11.282 9.839 5.151 7.464 16.426 3.967
Min. -9.385 -11.797 -8.565 -5.716 -21.788 -6.248
St. dev. 1.906 2.132 1.218 1.663 2.952 1.022
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of filtered excess bond returns for selected periods.
Period/Crisis Statistic Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Russia 17 August 1998 - 31 December 1998
Max. 9.240 15.375 3.135 9.398 42.382 1.808
Min. -16.797 -15.033 -4.644 -8.655 -115.147 -3.438
St. dev. 3.360 5.524 1.100 2.396 19.214 0.576
LTCM 23 September 1998 - 15 October 1998
Max. 9.240 8.890 3.135 4.877 17.253 1.808
Min. -2.946 -13.982 -3.330 -3.643 -12.520 -1.295
St. dev. 2.943 5.231 1.653 2.136 8.887 0.654
Brazil 7 January 1999 - 25 February 1999
Max. 9.876 16.824 1.571 7.866 30.430 0.571
Min. -11.254 -12.801 -2.708 -4.948 -58.979 -0.838
St. dev. 3.066 5.672 0.845 2.242 13.885 0.302
Dot-com 28 February 2000 - 7 June 2000
Max. 7.152 2.972 1.744 1.676 19.387 0.591
Min. -3.702 -3.595 -2.062 -2.240 -15.039 -0.738
St. dev. 1.369 1.221 0.721 0.775 3.866 0.256
Argentina 11 October 2001 - 3 March 2005
Max. 29.180 17.258 2.808 2.665 11.596 2.233
Min. -40.621 -38.084 -1.790 -2.699 -4.745 -1.426
St. dev. 6.385 2.603 0.643 0.600 1.257 0.349
U.S. Subprime 26 July 2007 - 31 December 2007
Max. 20.031 3.778 2.150 1.857 3.233 0.800
Min. -14.573 -2.595 -2.585 -1.980 -1.837 -1.366
St. dev. 3.631 1.092 0.884 0.682 0.941 0.363
Non-crisis
Max. 33.360 10.577 2.889 5.059 55.570 1.851
Min. -33.700 -5.690 -2.960 -4.257 -44.350 -1.352
St. dev. 3.418 1.202 0.577 0.650 4.358 0.258
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Table 4: Overidentification tests for common factors based on the J-statistic.
Crisis Statistic Number of Common Factors
Three Two One None
Russia/ J-statistic 25.631 42.819 71.993 339.739
LTCM dof 22 27 39 51
p-value 0.268 0.027 0.001 0.000
Brazil J-statistic 22.498 35.641 67.939 334.123
dof 34 39 51 63
p-value 0.934 0.624 0.056 0.000
Dot-com J-statistic 49.388 66.460 98.373 363.581
dof 34 39 51 63
p-value 0.043 0.004 0.000 0.000
Argentina J-statistic 50.826 54.878 143.806 369.569
dof 34 39 51 63
p-value 0.032 0.047 0.000 0.000
U.S. Subprime J-statistic 20.858 35.758 67.557 333.514
dof 34 39 51 63
p-value 0.962 0.619 0.060 0.000
Unrestricted model given by the column headed “Three common factors”. The restrictions
for “Two common factors” are based on  = 0 The restrictions for “One common factor”
are based on  = 0  = 0 The restrictions for “No common factors” are based on = 0  = 0  = 0 The last set of restrictions amounts to restricting the matrices 
and  in (16) and (17) respectively, as null matrices.
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Table 5: Contribution of contagion to stock and bond market volatility during crises.
Percentage of total volatility. The percentage contribution of the non-contagion component
to volatility is obtained by subtracting the reported contagion contribution from 100. For
comparison the variance of actual returns for stock and bonds for each country are also
reported.
Crisis Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Russia/ Contagion (%) 43.98 98.63 41.46 35.65 25.88 63.74
LTCM Variance 9.79 15.78 2.83 11.18 140.12 2.09
Brazil Contagion (%) 62.26 7.04 14.92 20.47 27.20 55.9
Variance 7.45 25.52 1.33 5.78 17.84 1.62
Dot-com Contagion (%) 92.47 39.63 2.97 88.50 0.46 2.12
Variance 2.62 3.69 2.92 7.09 11.18 2.15
Argentina Contagion (%) 4.59 61.93 7.04 1.91 0.02 6.90
Variance 9.07 5.42 1.28 1.80 4.16 1.73
U.S. Subprime Contagion (%) 28.20 42.64 44.97 44.49 3.86 13.62
Variance 4.05 9.22 3.33 4.72 2.83 2.77
Bond Markets
Russia/ Contagion (%) 31.01 89.33 45.92 85.67 4.55 31.38
LTCM Variance 11.29 30.52 1.21 5.74 369.17 0.33
Brazil Contagion (%) 14.73 4.73 12.28 82.48 65.09 7.58
Variance 9.40 32.17 0.72 5.03 192.80 0.09
Dot-com Contagion (%) 0.12 94.06 1.17 1.97 0.27 1.08
Variance 1.88 1.49 0.52 0.60 14.95 0.07
Argentina Contagion (%) 3.97 2.20 16.52 11.63 0.11 34.59
Variance 40.77 6.77 0.41 0.36 1.58 0.12
U.S. Subprime Contagion (%) 94.31 14.16 24.71 21.14 30.17 92.19
Variance 13.18 1.19 0.78 0.47 0.89 0.13
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Table 6: Breakdown of the contribution of contagion channels to overall contagion in stock
markets during crises.
Percentage of total volatility. A “n.a.” represents not applicable.
Crisis Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Russia/ Market (bond) 1.16 37.65 11.48 9.16 18.82 0.32
LTCM Country (Rus.) 38.05 2.57 6.92 13.48 n.a. 40.97
Idio. (Rus. bond) 4.35 51.95 1.49 2.36 6.32 0.90
Idio. (U.S. bond) 0.42 6.46 21.57 10.65 0.74 21.57
Total contagion 43.98 98.63 41.46 35.65 25.88 63.74
Variance 9.79 15.78 2.83 11.18 140.12 2.09
Brazil Market (bond) 0.73 0.07 5.61 6.16 22.48 21.21
Country (Brz.) 51.51 n.a. 1.43 10.50 0.13 2.46
Idio. (Brz. bond) 10.02 6.97 7.88 3.81 4.59 32.23
Total contagion 62.26 7.04 14.92 20.47 27.2 55.9
Variance 7.45 25.52 1.33 5.78 17.84 1.62
Dot-com Market (bond) 0.10 13.64 0.97 76.35 0.19 2.12
Country (U.S.) 85.40 5.63 0.27 1.96 0.02 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. stock) 6.93 20.36 1.72 10.20 0.25 n.a.
Total contagion 92.47 39.63 2.97 88.50 0.46 2.12
Variance 2.62 3.69 2.92 7.09 11.18 2.15
Argentina Market (bond) 4.58 18.70 0.98 0.28 0.00 0.65
Country (Arg.) n.a. 0.00 4.30 1.55 0.01 6.14
Idio. (Arg. bond) 0.01 43.23 1.76 0.08 0.01 0.11
Total contagion 4.59 61.93 7.04 1.91 0.02 6.9
Variance 9.07 5.42 1.28 1.80 4.16 1.73
U.S. Subprime Market (bond) 10.14 15.77 17.34 17.33 0.67 7.94
Idio. (U.S. stock) 5.31 7.74 8.11 7.28 1.18 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. bond) 12.75 19.13 19.52 19.88 2.01 5.68
Total contagion 28.20 42.64 44.97 44.49 3.86 13.62
Variance 4.05 9.22 3.33 4.72 2.83 2.77
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Table 7: Breakdown of the contribution of contagion channels to overall contagion in bond
markets during crises.
Percentage of total volatility. A “n.a.” represents not applicable.
Crisis Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Russia/ Market (stock) 12.11 26.68 4.92 27.57 4.50 5.85
LTCM Country (Rus.) 0.44 26.90 1.00 16.24 n.a. 22.88
Idio. (Rus. bond) 13.62 15.67 8.36 17.01 n.a. 2.65
Idio. (U.S. bond) 4.85 20.09 31.64 24.85 0.05 n.a.
Total contagion 31.01 89.33 45.92 85.67 4.55 31.38
Variance 11.29 30.52 1.21 5.74 369.17 0.33
Brazil Market (stock) 0.06 4.73 0.41 2.39 25.37 0.31
Country (Brz.) 14.57 n.a. 7.12 77.52 5.10 4.27
Idio. (Brz bond) 0.10 n.a. 4.75 2.57 34.62 3.00
Total contagion 14.73 4.73 12.28 82.48 65.09 7.58
Variance 9.40 32.17 0.72 5.03 192.80 0.09
Dot-com Market (stock) 0.09 42.91 0.58 1.55 0.00 0.47
Country (U.S.) 0.03 0.33 0.02 0.32 0.00 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. stock) 0.00 50.82 0.57 0.09 0.27 0.61
Total contagion 0.12 94.06 1.17 1.97 0.27 1.08
Variance 1.88 1.49 0.52 0.60 14.95 0.07
Argentina Market (stock) 3.97 0.53 5.12 5.14 0.01 13.43
Country (Arg.) n.a. 0.04 2.74 2.82 0.10 17.59
Idio. (Arg. bond) n.a. 1.63 8.66 3.67 0.00 3.57
Total contagion 3.97 2.2 16.52 11.63 0.11 34.59
Variance 40.77 6.77 0.41 0.36 1.58 0.12
U.S. Subprime Market (stock) 4.64 9.94 5.96 14.40 0.03 87.98
Idio. (U.S. stock) 84.90 1.75 3.56 2.72 0.03 4.21
Idio. (U.S. bond) 4.77 2.47 15.19 4.02 30.11 n.a.
Total contagion 94.31 14.16 24.71 21.14 30.17 92.19
Variance 13.18 1.19 0.78 0.47 0.89 0.13
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Table 8: Wald tests of contagion channels: p-values in brackets.
Test DOF Crisis
Russia Brazil Dot-com Argentina U.S.
/LTCM Subprime
Market (stock) 6 43.203 1457611.981 3391.138 2884.244 122980.105
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
Market (bond) 6 40.062 174942.085 252266.248 294191.709 305.378
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
Country 10 179.529 316208.574 254690.275 5055.812
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
Idiosyncratic 11 167.973
(Rus. bond) (0000)
Idiosyncratic 11 96.716 2254131.292
(U.S. bond) (0000) (0000)
Idiosyncratic 11 2026223.758
(Bra. bond) (0000)
Idiosyncratic 11 65483.898 137316.057
(U.S. stock) (0000) (0000)
Idiosyncratic 11 672290.298
(Arg. bond) (0000)
Joint 44() 762.078 3977390.807 724307.180 1002437.128 2540997.373
33() (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
(a) Degrees of freedom for the Russian/LTCM crisis.
(b) Degrees of freedom for the Brazilian, dot-com, Argentinian and U.S. subprime crises.
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Table 9: Sample sensitivity of Argentine crisis dates: stock and bond markets.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stocks October 11, 2001 to October 10, 2002
Market (bond) 19.84 25.74 1.47 2.30 0.00 1.44
Country (Arg.) n.a. 2.96 2.34 0.13 3.69 5.68
Idio. (Arg. bond) 0.17 3.59 25.71 5.87 10.09 48.04
October 11, 2001 to October 10, 2003
Market (bond) 3.27 25.75 2.22 3.14 0.28 2.35
Country (Arg.) n.a. 2.96 5.75 1.76 1.25 9.37
Idio. (Arg. bond) 0.49 3.60 23.53 0.56 2.37 37.77
October 11, 2001 to October 10, 2004
Market (bond) 15.40 25.78 0.76 1.23 0.01 0.74
Country (Arg.) n.a. 2.97 3.17 0.07 2.16 12.52
Idio. (Arg. Bond) 0.51 3.60 22.32 6.02 6.02 55.24
October 11, 2001 to June 3, 2005
Market (bond) 4.58 18.70 0.98 0.28 0.00 0.65
Country (Arg.) n.a. 0.00 4.30 1.55 0.01 6.14
Idio. (Arg. bond) 0.01 43.23 1.76 0.08 0.01 0.11
Bonds October 11, 2001 to October 10, 2002
Market (stock) 3.25 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 27.76
Country (Arg.) n.a. 1.96 2.40 0.62 0.28 30.98
Idio. (Arg. bond) n.a. 19.31 2.79 3.57 0.75 8.49
October 11, 2001 to October 10, 2003
Market (stock) 2.12 5.42 1.35 1.91 0.07 6.46
Country (Arg.) n.a. 35.95 4.17 8.83 0.02 1.95
Idio. (Arg. bond) n.a. 4.45 0.54 8.51 0.74 12.49
October 11, 2001 to October 10, 2004
Market (stock) 3.45 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 27.91
Country (Arg.) n.a. 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.02 28.83
Idio. (Arg. bond) n.a. 0.08 1.48 6.22 0.32 10.66
October 11, 2001 to June 3, 2005
Market (stock) 3.97 0.53 5.12 5.14 0.01 13.43
Country (Arg.) n.a. 0.04 2.74 2.82 0.10 17.59
Idio. (Arg. bond) n.a. 1.63 8.66 3.67 0.00 3.57
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Table 10: Extension of the model to allow for additional countries during the U.S.
subprime crisis. Percentage contribution of contagion to total variance. The results for the
original set of countries are contained in Tables 5 to 7.
Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S. Aust. Germ. Jap. U.K.
Stocks
35.41 66.21 54.72 58.51 22.95 47.62 70.47 52.46 15.22 71.93
Bonds
19.56 43.79 50.75 40.53 20.48 43.29 30.72 16.75 25.47 19.11
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Table 11: Conditional moment tests of the standardized VAR residuals for selected periods.
p-values. AR(1) based on testing  [−1 − 0]  ARCH(1) based on testing
 £(2 − 1) ¡2−1 − 1¢− 0¤ 
Crisis Statistic Asset Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Russia/LTCM AR(1) Stocks 0.312 0.813 0.183 0.900 0.426 0.175
AR(1) Bonds 0.099 0.886 0.616 0.591 0.409 0.865
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.473 0.190 0.386 0.442 0.273 0.179
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.325 0.600 0.463 0.109 0.761 0.215
Brazil AR(1) Stocks 0.848 0.435 0.376 0.305 0.207 0.439
AR(1) Bonds 0.132 0.265 0.998 0.036 0.184 0.365
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.474 0.331 0.831 0.536 0.314 0.299
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.229 0.929 0.220 0.652 0.979 0.505
Dot-com AR(1) Stocks 0.071 0.594 0.992 0.943 0.646 0.928
AR(1) Bonds 0.234 0.263 0.353 0.875 0.524 0.478
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.675 0.038 0.604 0.415 0.016 0.675
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.200 0.391 0.220 0.468 0.050 0.595
Argentina AR(1) Stocks 0.353 0.047 0.756 0.283 0.036 0.411
AR(1) Bonds 0.097 0.681 0.185 0.002 0.280 0.383
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.274 0.080 0.076 0.002 0.052 0.031
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.004 0.042 0.269 0.039 0.069 0.001
U.S. Subprime AR(1) Stocks 0.098 0.006 0.054 0.059 0.002 0.023
AR(1) Bonds 0.578 0.215 0.166 0.425 0.021 0.400
ARCH(1) Stocks 0.155 0.727 0.809 0.861 0.280 0.873
ARCH(1) Bonds 0.096 0.885 0.997 0.291 0.139 0.112
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Table 12: Wald tests of structural breaks: p-values in brackets.
Test Degrees of Crisis
freedom
Russia Brazil Dot-com Argentina U.S.
/LTCM Subprime
Market (stock) 6 93.382 246344.014 2968.468 116950.886 64.527
(0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
Market (bond) 6 38.170 996631.190 23.538 7199.044 2488.965
(0000) (0000) (0001) (0000) (0000)
Country 2 13.874 34066.684 8120.438
(0000) (0000) (0000)
Idiosyncratic 1 13.285
(Rus. bond) (0000)
Idiosyncratic 1 27.856 96.124
(U.S. bond) (0000) (0000)
Idiosyncratic 1 131.086
(Bra. bond) (0000)
Idiosyncratic 1 11.869
(U.S. stock) (0001)
Idiosyncratic 1 1271.660
(Arg. bond) (0000)
Joint 16(), 15(), 435.214 1278002.867 3456.122 223229.604 2849.671
12(), 14() (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
(a) Degrees of freedom for the Russian/LTCM crisis.
(b) Degrees of freedom for the Brazilian and Argentinian crises.
(c) Degrees of freedom for the dot-com crisis.
(d) Degrees of freedom for the U.S. subprime crisis.
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Figure 1: Figure 1: Daily stock and bond percentage excess returns, expressed in U.S.
dollars, 31st of March 1998 to 31st of December 2007. Data are unfiltered. The shaded
regions correspond to the crisis periods in the following order: Russia/LTCM, Brazil,
dot-com, Argentina, U.S. subprime.
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Figure 2: Model over-identification test p-values for sensitivity to crisis date selection:
-5,4,...0,...+4,+5 days. Continuous (dashed) line represents the start (end) of the crisis
period. The p-values at zero correspond to the values reported in Table VII. where the
number of common factors is three.
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Appendix A: Model Derivations
A. Optimal Portfolio Weights
For a normally distributed random variable ,  [exp] = exp ¡ [] + 1
2
  []¢  Defining
 ≡ exp then ln [] =  [ln ] + 1
2
  [ln ]  Assuming that period 2 wealth 2 is
lognormally distributed, the objective function in (2) is reexpressed as
max
½
(1− ) [ln2|Ω] + 1
2
(1− )2   [ln2|Ω]
¾

or
max
{(1− ) [ [ln (1 +) |Ω] + ln1] +1
2
(1− )2   [ln (1 +) |Ω]
¾
 (22)
by substituting out 2 in the objective function using the budget constraint in (3), and
where  [ln1|Ω] = ln1 and   [ln1|Ω] = 0 as 1 is known at time 1.
Using the definition of the portfolio return in (4) and some algebraic manipulation, the
ln [1 +] term in the objective function in (22) is expressed as
ln [1 +] = ln [1 + 0+ (1− 0) ]
= ln
£
1 + 0
¡
exp ln
¡
(1 +)−1 (1 +)¢− 1¢¤+ ln [1 + ] 
or, in terms of log excess returns
 −  = ln [1 + 0 (exp ( − )− 1)] 
where  ≡ ln (1 +) ;  ≡ ln (1 +) ;  ≡ ln (1 +)  represent the respective logarithm
of returns. The excess portfolio return is approximated by taking a Taylor series expansion
around zero excess return ( −  = 0)
 −  ' 0 ( − ) + 12
0 ( − ) ( − )0 (1− 0) 
where the third and higher order terms are assumed to be small.
Taking expectations of the excess portfolio return conditional on the information set of the
 investor, and rearranging gives
 [( − ) |Ω] ' 0 [( − ) |Ω] + 12
0
£
( − ) ( − )0 |Ω¤ (1− 0)
 [|Ω]−  ' 0 ( [|Ω]− ) + 12
0  [( − ) |Ω] (1− 0)
 [|Ω] ' 0 ( [|Ω]− ) + 12
0  [|Ω] (1− 0) +   (23)
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and
  [( − ) |Ω] '   [(0 ( − )) |Ω]
  [|Ω] ' 0  [|Ω] (24)
Upon substituting (23) and (24) into (22), together with the definition of log portfolio returns
 ≡ ln (1 +), the objective function is rewritten as
max
½
(1− )
∙
0 ( [|Ω]− ) + 12
0  [|Ω] (1− 0) +  + ln1
¸
(25)
+
1
2
(1− )2 0  [|Ω]
¾

Diﬀerentiating (25) with respect to  yields the optimal solution to the portfolio problem
of the informed and the uninformed investors given in (9)
∗ = 1
∙
 [|Ω]−  + 1
2
 [|Ω]
¸
 [|Ω]−1  (26)
B. Informed Investor Conditional Expectations
Using  ≡ ln (1 +) combined with the definition of  = ( −  )  in (5) and the liquida-
tion value definition in (6), gives
 = ln  + ln− ln (27)
Now taking conditional expectations based on the information set Ω in (10), yields the
following conditional expectations of the informed investor
 [|Ω ] = ln  + [ln|Ω ]− ln = ln  +  ln  − ln (28)
and
  [|Ω ] =   [ln|Ω ] = 0 + Σ (29)
where
 [ln|Ω ] =  [ln +1|Ω ] + £ln +1 |Ω |¤ =  ln 
  [ln|Ω ] =   [ln +1|Ω ] 0 +   £ln +1 |Ω |¤ = 0 +  
Substituting (28) and (29) into the optimal solution of the informed investor’s portfolio
problem in (9) with  =  gives
∗ = ln  +  ln  − ln −  +
1
2
(0 + Σ)
 (0 + Σ) 
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C. Uninformed Investor Conditional Expectations
The conditional expectations of (27) based on the information set Ω in (12), are
 [|Ω ] =  [ln |Ω ]− ln
and
  [|Ω ] =   [ln |Ω ] 
The solution to the uninformed investor’s optimization problem given in (9) with  =  is
reexpressed using the expressions for the conditional expectations given above
∗ = ( [ln |Ω ]− ln )−  +
1
2
  [ln |Ω ]
  [ln |Ω ] 
Unlike the conditional expectations of the informed investor, calculation of the uninformed
investor’s conditional expectations are more involved as it is now necessary to form expec-
tations of  as well as . To achieve this, consider the market equilibrium condition where
the supply of the risky asset ( ) equals demand by the market participants
 = ∗1 + ∗1 + ln 
where  and  are respectively the number of informed and uninformed investors. Using
the expressions of ∗ and ∗ derived above
 =  ln  +  ln  − ln −  +
1
2
(0 + Σ)
 (0 + Σ) 1
+ [ln |Ω ]− ln −  +
1
2
  [ln |Ω ]
  [ln |Ω ] 1 + ln  (30)
Rearranging this equation in terms of those variables not contained in the information set
of the uninformed investor as a function of ln , gives
 (ln ) = ln  +  (
0 + Σ)
1 ln 
=
 (0 + Σ)
1
⎡
⎣  −  [ln |Ω ]− ln −  +
1
2
  [ln |Ω ]
  [ln |Ω ] 1
+− ln  + ln +  −
1
2
(0 + Σ)
 (0 + Σ) 1
¸

To ensure that uninformed investor’s expectations conditional on equilibrium prices are con-
sistent with that conditional on the information revealed by  ( ), the following “belief
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consistency” conditions are imposed
 [ln |Ω ] =  [ln | (ln )]
=  [ln ] +  [ln   (ln )] (  [ (ln )])−1
× ( (ln )− [ (ln )])
=  + Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0
#−1
×
∙
ln  +  (
0 + Σ)
1 ln − 
¸

(31)
  [ln |Ω ] =   [ln | (ln )]
=   [ln ]−  [ln   (ln )] (  [ (ln )])−1
× ( [ln   (ln )])0
= [Σ + Σ]
−Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0
#−1
Σ0
which represent the required conditional expectations of the uninformed investor.
D. Excess Returns Equation
The derivations of the model given above are based on the return on the asset  which is
unknown as it is a function of the asset’s liquidation value , which by definition is unknown.
To derive an expression of the observed or realized excess return on the asset, the following
steps are adopted. Substitute the conditional expectations in (31) into the market-clearing
condition in (30), and rearrange to generate an expression of the current price in terms of
the factors
ln = +  ln  +  ln +  ln  (32)
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where
 = 0 +1
⎡
⎣ −Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0
#−1⎤
⎦ 
 =
⎡
⎣1Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0
#−1
+2
⎤
⎦ 
 =
⎡
⎣1Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0
#−1  (0 + Σ)
1 +3
⎤
⎦ 
 = 4
and
0 = −Ψ−1
∙
 +  1
µ
  [ln | ln ]−1 − 1
2
¶
+

 1
µ
 (0 + Σ)−1 − 1
2
¶¸

1 = Ψ−1 1  [ln | ln ]
−1 
2 = Ψ−1 1 (
0 + Σ)−1 
3 = Ψ−1
4 = Ψ−1 1 (
0 + Σ)−1 
Ψ =  1 (
0 + Σ)−1 +  1  [ln | ln ]
−1 
Now let +1 be the realized price in the next period, formally the realization from the
distribution of , be given by
ln+1 =  [ln |Ω ] + ln 
where ln  is the expectations error which under the assumption of rational expectations is
assumed to be . Then the realized return is
ln2 − ln =  [ln |Ω ] + ln  − ln
=  + Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0
#−1
×
∙
ln  +  (
0 + Σ)
1 ln − 
¸
+ ln  − −  ln  −  ln −  ln 
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where the last step is based on using the expression for  [ln |Ω ] in (31) and the expression
for ln in (32). Or, in terms of excess returns, ln+1−ln−  the factor equation becomes
 = 0 + 1 ln  + 2 ln + 3 ln  + 4 ln 
where
0 =
⎧
⎨
⎩ − Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0
#−1⎫⎬
⎭  − − 
1 = Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0
#−1
− 
2 = Σ
"
Σ +
µ 
1
¶2
(0 + Σ)Σ (0 + Σ)0
#−1  (0 + Σ)
1 − 
3 = −
4 =  
This is the most general factor representation of excess returns during financial crises as
it includes both “normal” and contagious transmission mechanisms. In a non-crisis period
where there is no contagion, this is represented by 0 and Σ being diagonal matrices.
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Appendix B: Data Sources and Definitions
Table B1: Data mnemonics, definitions and sources.
Country Asset Description Code1
Argentina Stocks MERVAL Index ARGMERV(PI) (D)
Bonds 1. 11% coupon (issued in USD) 007022140 (B)
Issued October 9, 1996. Matures
October 9, 2006
2. 11.375% coupon (issued in USD) 010909899 (B)
Issued March 15, 2000. Matures
March 15, 2010
Currency Argentinian peso per USD ARGPES$ (D)
Brazil Stock BOVESPA Index BRBOVES(PI) (D)
Bond 1. 9.375% coupon (issued in USD) 105756AG5 (B)
Issued March 31, 1998. Matures
April 7, 2008
2. 10.25% coupon (issued in USD) 017062875 (B)
Issued June 17, 2003. Matures
June 17, 2013
Currency Brazilian real per USD BRACRU$ (D)
Canada Stock S&P/TSX Index TTOCOMP(PI) (D)
Bond Corporate BBB (issued in Canadian C28810Y (B)
dollars)
Currency Canadian dollar per USD CNDOLL$ (D)
Mexico Stock BOLSA Index MXIPC35(PI) (D)
Bond 1. 8.625% coupon (issued in USD) 8534713 (B)
Issued March 5, 1998. Matures
March 12, 2008
2. 6.375% coupon (issued in USD) 016113468 (B)
Issued January 16, 2003. Matures
January 16, 2013
Currency Mexican peso per USD MEXPES$ (D)
1(B) denotes Bloomberg, (D) denotes Datastream.
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Table B1 continued: Data mnemonics, definitions and sources.
Country Asset Description Code1
Russia Stocks RSF EE MT Index RSMTIND(PI) (D)
Bonds 1. 3% coupon (issued in USD) TT3182314 (B)
Issued May 14, 1993. Matures
May 14 2008.
2. 3% coupon (issued in USD) 008170363 (B)
Issued May 14, 1996. Matures
May 14, 2011
Currency Russian rouble per USD CISRUB$ (D)
U.S. Stocks Dow Jones Index DJINDUS(PI) (D)
Bonds Corporate BBB bond rate C00910Y (B)
Australia Stocks Australian All Ordinaries Index AS30 Index (B)
Bonds Corporate BBB bond rate AC40 Index (B)
(issued in AUD)
Currency Australian dollar per USD USDAUSP (D)
Germany Stocks German HDAX Index HDAX Index (B)
Bonds Corporate BBB bond rate ER46 Index (B)
(issued in Euro)
Currency Euro per USD EURO.US (D)
Japan Stocks TOPIX Index TPX Index (B)
Bonds Corpoate BBB bond rate JC40 Index (B)
(issued in yen)
Currency Japanese yen per USD JPYN1UD (D)
U.K. Stocks UK FTSE ALL Share Index ASX Index (B)
Bonds Corporate BBB bond rate UR47 Index (B)
(issued in pounds)
Currency British pound per USD BRITPUS (D)
1(B) denotes Bloomberg, (D) denotes Datastream.
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Appendix C: Additional Variance Decompositions
Table C1: Variance decompositions, Russian/LTCM crisis: percentage of total.
Also see footnote 8 for an explanation of the n.a. in the results for the U.S.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 1.12 0.20 0.03 1.02 0.18 13.79
Common 2 10.91 0.36 13.76 5.57 0.15 15.27
Emerging 1.24 0.27 n.a. n.a. 0.19 n.a.
Market (stock) 16.03 0.23 5.12 10.60 52.75 7.21
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country 2.37 0.05 15.23 0.43 19.92 n.a.
Idio. 24.34 0.26 24.40 46.75 0.93 n.a.
Contagion Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 1.16 37.65 11.48 9.16 18.82 0.32
Country (Russia) 38.05 2.57 6.92 13.48 n.a. 40.97
Idio. (Rus. bond) 4.35 51.95 1.49 2.36 6.32 0.90
Idio. (U.S. bond) 0.42 6.46 21.57 10.65 0.74 21.57
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 9.79 15.78 2.83 11.18 140.12 2.09
Bond Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 0.00 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.48 0.22
Common 2 3.79 5.14 5.81 7.12 3.10 5.55
Emerging 0.34 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.78 n.a.
Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 6.66 2.86 24.24 4.12 23.82 29.06
Country 1.29 1.26 12.84 2.22 47.14 n.a.
Idio. 56.91 1.38 10.92 0.86 20.13 33.79
Contagion Market (stock) 12.11 26.68 4.92 27.57 4.50 5.85
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country (Russia) 0.44 26.90 1.00 16.24 n.a. 22.88
Idio. (Rus. bond) 13.62 15.67 8.36 17.01 n.a. 2.65
Idio. (U.S. bond) 4.85 20.09 31.64 24.85 0.05 n.a.
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 11.29 30.52 1.21 5.74 369.17 0.33
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Table C2: Variance decompositions, Brazilian crisis: percentage of total.
Also see footnote 8 for an explanation of the n.a. in the results for the U.S.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 4.00 0.82 13.54 2.46 0.01 40.02
Common 2 7.26 8.20 7.95 8.01 0.52 0.54
Emerging 1.19 4.27 n.a. n.a. 0.22 n.a.
Market (stock) 1.23 1.49 0.13 2.40 70.40 3.54
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country 4.74 74.46 19.77 14.09 0.89 n.a.
Idio. 19.32 3.73 43.70 52.58 0.77 n.a.
Contagion Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 0.73 0.07 5.61 6.16 22.48 21.21
Country (Brazil) 51.51 n.a. 1.43 10.50 0.13 2.46
Idio. (Brz. bond) 10.02 6.97 7.88 3.81 4.59 32.23
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 7.45 25.52 1.33 5.78 17.84 1.62
Bond Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 3.78 2.17 8.46 7.55 0.02 0.95
Common 2 1.35 0.97 7.37 3.19 0.04 0.08
Emerging 0.46 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.01 n.a.
Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 0.48 13.74 4.12 2.26 34.23 3.24
Country 1.01 77.54 42.44 0.14 0.00 0.00
Idio. 78.18 0.85 25.34 4.38 0.62 88.15
Contagion Market (stock) 0.06 4.73 0.41 2.39 25.37 0.31
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country (Brazil) 14.57 n.a. 7.12 77.52 5.10 4.27
Idio. (Brz. bond) 0.10 n.a. 4.75 2.57 34.62 3.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 9.40 32.17 0.72 5.03 192.80 0.09
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Table C3: Variance decompositions, dot-com crisis: percentage of total.
Also see footnote 8 for an explanation of the n.a. in the results for the U.S.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 0.01 17.60 0.31 0.01 30.89 25.67
Common 2 1.11 39.86 36.55 0.28 18.21 69.87
Emerging 0.03 17.73 n.a. n.a. 48.69 n.a.
Market (stock) 4.81 6.59 1.57 10.32 0.39 0.71
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country 0.00 1.42 14.78 0.02 0.10 0.04
Idio. 1.42 0.25 46.02 1.21 1.47 3.66
Contagion Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 0.07 4.30 0.02 75.71 0.03 0.05
Country (U.S.) 86.06 1.06 0.03 2.05 0.17 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. stock) 6.50 11.19 0.72 10.40 0.04 n.a.
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 2.62 3.69 2.92 7.09 11.18 2.15
Bond Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 0.01 0.02 0.43 0.31 0.53 0.00
Common 2 3.41 4.42 8.37 40.09 2.92 0.04
Emerging 0.08 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.60 n.a.
Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 0.63 0.88 0.19 9.13 0.22 0.05
Country 93.64 5.15 60.89 13.84 0.05 0.02
Idio. 0.58 0.01 29.31 7.42 95.47 98.91
Contagion Market (stock) 1.04 35.66 0.30 17.03 0.13 0.35
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country (U.S.) 0.27 0.77 0.45 4.23 0.01 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. stock) 0.35 53.08 0.07 7.96 0.07 0.64
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 1.88 1.49 0.52 0.60 14.95 0.07
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Table C4: Variance decompositions, Argentinian crisis: percentage of total.
Also see footnote 8 for an explanation of the n.a. in the results for the U.S.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 0.55 0.00 1.02 0.05 0.13 19.05
Common 2 23.59 0.24 36.36 13.68 10.36 73.16
Emerging 1.83 0.12 n.a. n.a. 12.01 n.a.
Market (stock) 1.49 37.58 0.48 0.01 0.01 0.90
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country 29.27 0.04 11.64 0.69 11.35 n.a.
Idio. 38.68 0.10 43.47 83.67 66.11 n.a.
Contagion Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 4.58 18.70 0.98 0.28 0.00 0.65
Country (Arg.) n.a. 0.00 4.30 1.55 0.01 6.14
Idio. (Arg. bond) 0.01 43.23 1.76 0.08 0.01 0.11
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 9.07 5.42 1.28 1.80 4.16 1.73
Bond Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 5.64 18.63 7.08 13.94 1.52 0.00
Common 2 15.87 47.43 11.14 45.42 3.14 0.00
Emerging 1.95 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.00 n.a.
Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 10.57 0.01 1.52 0.05 0.01 64.79
Country 62.00 10.16 63.16 10.88 1.52 n.a.
Idio. 0.00 21.58 0.60 18.08 93.69 0.62
Contagion Market (stock) 3.97 0.53 5.12 5.14 0.01 13.43
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country (Arg.) n.a. 0.04 2.74 2.82 0.10 17.59
Idio. (Arg. bond) n.a. 1.63 8.66 3.67 0.00 3.57
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Variance 40.77 6.77 0.41 0.36 1.58 0.12
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Table C5: Variance decompositions, U.S. subprime crisis: percentage of total.
Also see footnote 8 for an explanation of the n.a. in the results for the U.S.
Market Factor Arg. Brz. Can. Mex. Rus. U.S.
Stock Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 3.10 9.25 0.20 1.57 12.62 4.08
Common 2 15.58 10.54 7.88 4.05 6.65 8.05
Emerging 1.95 9.34 n.a. n.a. 7.59 n.a.
Market (stock) 11.43 19.64 23.13 14.70 8.59 65.69
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Country 4.53 0.89 9.52 0.23 0.06 n.a.
Idio. 35.20 7.72 14.31 34.96 60.63 8.57
Contagion Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 10.14 15.77 17.34 17.33 0.67 7.94
Idio. (U.S. stock) 5.31 7.74 8.11 7.28 1.18 n.a.
Idio. (U.S. bond) 12.75 19.13 19.52 19.88 2.01 5.68
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Variance 4.05 9.22 3.33 4.72 2.83 2.77
Bond Markets
Noncontagion Common 1 0.00 0.19 0.60 0.12 0.35 0.34
Common 2 0.06 56.19 11.28 53.81 1.79 4.96
Emerging 0.01 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.49 n.a.
Market (stock) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Market (bond) 4.62 0.89 11.04 2.39 42.32 0.16
Country 0.02 25.06 25.28 22.31 12.32 n.a.
Idio. 0.97 3.50 27.11 0.22 12.57 2.34
Contagion Market (stock) 4.64 9.94 5.96 14.40 0.03 87.98
Market (bond) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Idio. (U.S. stock) 84.90 1.75 3.56 2.72 0.03 4.21
Idio. (U.S. bond) 4.77 2.47 15.19 4.02 30.11 n.a.
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Variance 13.18 1.19 0.78 0.47 0.89 0.13
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